











Katz, Daniel (2017) Robert Duncan and the 60s : psychoanalysis, politics, kitsch. Qui Parle : 
Critical Humanities and Social. 
 
Permanent WRAP URL: 
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/99853  
 
Copyright and reuse: 
The Warwick Research Archive Portal (WRAP) makes this work by researchers of the 
University of Warwick available open access under the following conditions. Copyright © 
and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the individual 
author(s) and/or other copyright owners. To the extent reasonable and practicable the 
material made available in WRAP has been checked for eligibility before being made 
available. 
 
Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit 
purposes without prior permission or charge. Provided that the authors, title and full 
bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata 
page and the content is not changed in any way. 
 
Publisher’s statement: 
© 2018 Duke University Press. 
https://www.dukeupress.edu/qui-parle  
 
A note on versions: 
The version presented here may differ from the published version or, version of record, if 
you wish to cite this item you are advised to consult the publisher’s version. Please see the 
‘permanent WRAP URL’ above for details on accessing the published version and note that 
access may require a subscription. 
 
For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: wrap@warwick.ac.uk 
 
 1 
ROBERT DUNCAN AND THE 60S: PSYCHOANALYSIS, POLITICS, KITSCH 
 
Daniel Katz, University of Warwick 
 
  Politics and Kitsch  
 
 In an important recent reading of Ezra Pound’s Cantos, Daniel Tiffany affirms that 
Pound’s famous “poem including history” turns out to be anything but: Pound’s epic 
aspiration cohabits uneasily with “kitsch,”1 which transforms the “modern, redemptive 
totality” the Cantos had meant to promise into a vision of “archaic totalitarianism”: “On its 
own terms, as a poetic vision of utopia, the Cantos is a failure: It is not, as Pound claimed, ‘a 
poem containing history’ but a poem containing, and consumed by, myth: by delusional, 
bourgeois myths—which Pound converts into neo-pagan ‘mysteries’—of class and racial 
hatred.”2  Kitsch’s archaizing diction and structural nostalgia in this instance create a futurity 
in the image of a past which never existed. According to Tiffany, this devastating legacy 
meant that the next generation of American poets mostly read the Cantos through a 
fragmentary “hyper-formalist” lens, isolating the achievements of Pound as “better 
craftsman,” as it were, while bracketing the pretensions to epic synthesis of a cultural and 
political totality.  For Tiffany, the result was that “the appeal and function of kitsch in the 
Cantos could not even begin to be acknowledged, debated or tested.”3 
 If in many respects Tiffany’s account holds true, there is an important exception that 
this essay will discuss:  Robert Duncan, who, as we shall see, employs an overwhelmingly 
Poundian poetics as the basis of his work on the student and anti-Vietnam war protests of the 
60s in the San Francisco Bay Area, in no way shying away from Pound’s kitschier aspects—
archaic diction, sentimentality, ostentatious literariness and stylistic inauthenticity. Given not 
only Pound’s own anti-Semitism and support for Mussolini but also the well known 
association of kitsch with fascism, the deployment of kitsch as the foundation of a liberatory, 
communalist, and queer leftwing poetics in the fifties and sixties was counter-intuitive, to put 
it mildly. However, my contention here will be that it was also surprisingly prescient, and 
holds a potential which if far from fully realized also remains unexhausted. The promise of 
Duncan’s embrace of kitsch lies in the elaboration of an explicitly anti-capitalist leftwing 
poetics and politics that would avoid some of the pitfalls of rationalist critique, or the 
impasses of a political problematic based on “false consciousness.” Rather, Duncan’s writing 
can be seen as a fascinating attempt to inscribe into poetics and concrete action what Samo 
Tomsic has called the unconscious as the subject of politics.4  That Duncan’s project was not 
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entirely successful, as we shall see when we examine his interventions during the sixties, 
vitiates neither its historical significance nor its interest with regard to today’s struggles.  The 
latter sections of this essay will examine in detail Duncan’s work in the sixties in the context 
not only of political contestation in the U.S. but also of the issues and debates that surrounded 
May 1968 in France. To start with, however, I would like to sketch the development of 
Duncan’s kitsch poetics in his theoretical writings, notably the recently published H. D. Book.  
 In this work, begun as a homage to the modernist poet H. D. (Hilda Doolittle)—one 
of the most important contemporary poets for Duncan from his adolescence onwards— a 
crucial underpinning of the entire project is nothing but a probing and extension of the 
“kitsch” aspects of Pound’s Cantos, in the interest of an anti-capitalist poetics that puts the 
political and redemptive aspirations of Pound’s work (despite Pound’s tragic inadequacy) at 
the very center of any consideration of his importance.5  In Duncan’s rendering, H. D. as 
woman, queer, and Freudian analysand becomes the emblem and embodiment of the true 
emancipatory potential of all that Pound had to abject. Duncan refers in several instances to 
Pound’s own phrase stating that the Cantos possessed “the defects inherent in a record of 
struggle,” but Duncan finds these defects also to be the poem’s true virtues. Where Pound 
had hoped for eternal truths, on the contrary Duncan considers the Cantos to be more like a 
hysterical body locked entirely into its own history, and incorporating “the troubled spirit of 
our times as no other work in poetry does.”6  Thus, contra Tiffany, Duncan would suggest 
that the Cantos do contain history, by virtue of their own exuberant symptomaticity.  
 But Duncan turns this in his own particular way, intriguingly suggesting: “It is his 
[Pound’s] impersonating genius that, even where he presents flashes of eternal mind—
veritas, claritas, hilaritas—they do not appear as a sublimation of the poem but remain 
involved, by defect, in the agony of the contemporary” (HD, 55). Duncan’s stress on 
“impersonating”—likely an allusion to Pound as translator and author of Personae, reliant on  
a poetics founded on speaking the voices of others7 —valorizes those very aspects that had 
brought Pound criticism from so many other quarters, not least Wyndham Lewis, as Duncan 
implies that Pound’s very subjective porosity rather than originality or mastery are the core of 
his value for poetry as a form of political and communal practice. 8  Pound inadvertently 
becomes the model of the poetic subject for Duncan, and as we shall see, he will argue that it 
is in his unconscious that Pound possesses a meaningful intelligence, as opposed to the 
stupidities of his articulated positions. But for now, let us note that this “impersonating 
genius” so dear to Duncan bears a striking resemblance to one of the key elements of 
Tiffany’s matrix of kitsch—“imposture”—and that Duncan in his explicit theorizing or poetic 
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practice either argues for or makes use of all of the elements of what Tiffany calls the “kitsch 
platform” that confronted early modernism: “archaism,” “sentimentality,” “stereotypical 
diction,” “melodrama.”9  Regarding Pound, and Anglo-American modernism as a whole, 
Duncan’s strategy is not to purify them and therefore make them palatable to a post-war 
counter-cultural left (a project which would ironically duplicate Modernism’s own) but rather 
to examine modernism’s desire for purity itself.  This is hardly unique. But Duncan’s 
proximity to or even immersion in “kitsch” makes evident that his project is undertaken in 
something other than a spirit of demystification, while it in no way abjures the tools of 
critique.  If the proximity of kitsch to fascism is well known and frequently discussed, 
Duncan locates Pound’s problems elsewhere;10 in many ways, Duncan’s emancipatory 
poetics propose as their model the ideal of an even kitschier Cantos. By refusing both 
Pound’s own modernist critique of himself (as insufficiently “modernized”), and a bourgeois-
liberal recuperation of Pound as technician (which on the contrary might see Pound’s 
political aspirations as overly “modernist”), Duncan finds in Pound the foundations of a 
revolutionary poetics.  What are conventionally considered Pound’s “mistakes”—his 
insistence on political engagement (for example, his refusal to accept a reified poetic object 
that would propose to sustain itself independently from the question of its circulation within 
social exchange), 11 or his failure to expunge the tonal marks of the unconscious in the form 
of heightened, unidiomatic diction (Duncan is merciless on Pound’s condemnation of 
“rhetoric”)—are what Duncan does not want to correct. Neither the defensive pleasures of 
camp nor the masochistically defenseless ones of abjection for Duncan, whose poetics work 
against the policing of the relationship to both self and object both those stances imply. 
 
Hysteria, Self-Possession, and the Lyric Subject 
 
On the contrary, what Duncan implicitly proposes throughout is a different 
relationship to symptomaticity in terms of how, where, and on what authority texts speak. In 
this context, the emphasis on “impersonation” along with the related kitsch hallmarks of 
sentimentality and melodrama lead to another discourse that figures explicitly in Duncan’s H. 
D. Book—that of hysteria, as for Duncan it is precisely Pound’s poetic corpus that speaks 
what his conscious voice cannot know. Hysteria, by way of its etymology and historical 
association with women, allows Duncan to understand his own intense relationship to female 
writers and teachers: “I had found my life in poetry through the agency of certain women 
and. . . I had then perhaps a special estimation not only of the masters of that art but of its 
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mistresses” (HD, 69). Yet, as he goes on to write, “Poetry is the Mother of those who have 
created their own mothers” (HD, 70). At the same time, for Duncan psychoanalysis is the 
self-cancelling master discourse that allows modernism, and by extension politics and poetry, 
to be something other than a discourse of mastery, whether a master or a mistress is asked to 
occupy that position.  If  Duncan finds Pound’s value to arise very much from how his work 
manages to be “within” its own moment, the problem then is how the poet can release herself 
to these forces of history and the social rather than master them, and by extension release 
herself as productive worker in language to the community. Hysteria is one name that 
Duncan gives to this attempt, in opposition to the “respectability” of the “eminently sane” T. 
S. Eliot and Wallace Stevens. Of Pound and D. H. Lawrence, Duncan writes: “There is 
hysteria. . .  just where the man strives to bring his individual awareness and the communal 
awareness into one” (HD, 360). What is excessive or “discordant” (HD, 361), such as the 
“rant, the bravado, the sarcasm” of Pound, Lawrence, and W. C. Williams arises from this 
imperative in a manner whose violence can be positive: “The discord of their modes to the 
social norm is a therapeutic art” (HD, 361).  And ultimately, the success of Pound’s art lies 
above all in its success as a symptom.  Pound’s poetic practice, with its rebus-like ideograms, 
the privilege given to translation, the theoretical emphasis on condensation, makes Pound for 
Duncan the great Freudian poet, as unlikely as this might seem, not least to Pound himself: 
“Pound is a great Dreamer, and it was a condition of his Dream that he vehemently and even 
violently reject the Freudian breakthru [sic] that began the translation of the language of 
dreams into our daily consciousness” (HD, 369). But Duncan doesn’t reify symptomaticity 
itself as an unruly and liberatory rebuke to repression, of a necessarily “therapeutic” kind. In 
fact, it is precisely the trope of hysteria which allows him to hypothesize a different return of 
the repressed, this time on the scale of a planetary event rather than a work of “art.” Indeed, 
in a striking passage hysteria becomes Duncan’s trope for the most apocalyptic historical 
scenario, an hysterical return of the repressed on the macrocosmic scale of the planet and the 
microcosmic scale of the chromosome: 
 
In areas of science that most avoided such thought, even the psychoanalytic 
subconscious of Freud much less the subliminal self of Myers—men, as if they did 
not know what they were doing, insured the great hysterical possibility of our time—
the increase of pressures and explosion in the atom bomb, the radioactive aftermath 
that would riot in the chromosomic structure of man, that most would increase to a 
new power the meaning of the hysteric thing, this suffering in the womb. (HD, 606) 
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Duncan’s task is to elaborate a different hysterical possibility, and bringing the hysterical 
project to a more positive end entails a new conception of subjectivity not entirely unrelated 
to Pound’s “personation.” Duncan begins by identifying poetic work with the community and 
indeed the commons: 
 
The poet, too, is a worker, for the language, even as the field and the factory, belongs 
to the productive orders and means in which the communal good lies.  All that is 
unjust, all that has been taken over for private exploitation from the commune, leaves 
us restless with time, divorced from the eternal.  If I had come under the orders of 
poetry, I saw too that those orders would come into their full volition only when 
poetry was no longer taken to be a profession and when the poet would be seen to 
share in the daily labor toward the common need. (HD, 67) 
 
 However, for Duncan this relationship to the common good can only be achieved 
through a crucial form of dispossession—one which for Duncan is intimately related to the 
psychoanalytic project—which informs the poet’s relation both to her own experiences and to 
her experience of the production of poetry. It entails a rejection of what current corporate 
(and therefore, academic) jargon calls “ownership” in the broadest possible terms. As Duncan 
succinctly puts it in the H. D. Book “: . . . self-expression and likewise self-possession in 
verse would set up an ‘I’ that is the private property of the writer in the place of the ‘I’ in 
which all men may participate” (HD, 559).12 The double-meaning of “self-possession” 
indicates that two alienations go hand in here: that of the misrecognition integral to locating 
mastery in the authority of the conscious ego, and that of the auto-reification which comes 
from thinking of the self in terms of ownership and property, and commodifiable labor 
power. A truly communal writing can only come from beyond them both, as the “I” belongs 
to the unconscious on one side and the community on the other. But note also the specificity 
of Duncan’s language:  as opposed to the self as “private property” Duncan proposes not the I 
as enlightenment universal, but rather the I as common property, as offered to the communal 
project—the hysterical gift of the dispossessed self, one in which the poetic body of the text 
might be shared by all, in a new version of the totem feast. For Duncan, then, “self-
possession” in the psychological sense—the reification of the coherent ego, the firm policing 
of its boundaries—is inherently allied to the conception of one’s self as a possession, to be 
bartered in alienated form for personal gain on the literary market-place, and whose value 
might actually be increased by a little bit of self-expressive neurotic spice.  Or as Duncan 
writes in an essay with the pointedly punning title “Properties and Our REAL Estate” and in 
a phrase which is also an excellent example of Duncan’s repurposing of kitsch diction for 
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cultural critique: : “. . . where communism makes manifest that nothing is owned by the right 
of any one but all is by the grace of God, we will shed our self-possession.”13 
 What is required, then, is is a process of dispossession of conscious mastery 
undertaken in the project of the dereification of the isolate individual, rather than in order to 
increase its autonomy, adaptability, or functionality within a capitalist system based on 
affirming one’s self as a privately owned source of labor power to be sold. As Duncan 
developed these ideas largely from the mid-fifties to the mid-sixties, his thinking dovetailed 
in important ways with the differing critiques of ego-psychology formulated by Adorno and 
Lacan at roughly the same period, and also points to a psychoanalytic poetics very different 
from that emerging among the confessional poets during this time.  Rather, Duncan’s 
position, in which hysteria and labor come together in a communal, liberatory project, 
parallels the logic recently described by David Pavón-Cuéllar as he critiques the reified and 
atomized bourgeois subject which underpins most modern theoretical psychology: “To 
dissipate the psychological ghost, it suffices that hysterics express themselves on the couch or 
workers on barricades.”14 
 
Prohibition and Permission 
 
 In terms of how Duncan derives such radical stances from the very same modernist 
poetics that lay behind so many of the confessionals, H. D.’s Tribute to Freud—an account of 
the poet’s sessions with Freud—proves crucial as it provides a Freudian psychoanalysis of 
praxis as much as of interpretation that opens the way for Duncan to new imaginings of 
collectivity and its forms, including poetry and myth. But in the first instance, this means that 
Freud becomes the name of what gives H. D. the “permission”—one that her own work will 
be crucial in transmitting to Duncan15—to move beyond an Imagist poetics largely founded 
on Mosaic and patriarchal repression, exclusion, and prohibition, as the title of Pound’s 
famous “A Few Don’ts for Imagists” makes crystal clear: 
 
It was Freud’s role in H.D.’s second initiation to bring her from the formative 
prohibitions that had given rise to the modern style, from the stage which Pound’s “A 
Few Don’ts” represents, into a work which involved exactly those prohibited areas—
repetition, remplissage, or sentiment.  Associations must here not be cut away, 
dismissed, paraphrased or omitted, but dealt with, searched out until they yielded 
under new orders their meanings. Where the modern artist had sought a clean, vital, 
energetic, ascetic form—repression and compression—Freud sought the profound, 
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delving in unclean thoughts, depressions, neuroses, voluptuous dreams.  The Freudian 
permission or command saw form as a swarming ground.  (HD, 384) 
 
If much in the above statement clearly rhymes with both the decadent modernism of, say, a 
Djuna Barnes,16 and the “first word, best word” liberatory poetics of Allen Ginsberg, 
Duncan’s position contains important differences with both, notably in terms of his 
understanding of liberation itself, in relation to spontaneity, revision, and, as we shall see, 
law.17  In Duncan’s psychoanalytically inspired poetics, the “first word” might be the “best 
word” in some sense, but it cannot be the last word. A poetics that valorizes “repetition” and 
the processes of working-through intrinsic to analysis must also be open to revision. Indeed, 
revision without erasure is central to the dilatory form of the entire H. D. Book, which 
Duncan posits as explicitly palimpsestic: “I seek now in working upon the later draft of the 
book not to correct the original but to live again in its form and content, leaving in successive 
layers record of reformations and digressions as they come to me” (HD, 427).18  In Duncan’s 
view, this is in stark contrast to the collaborative mutilation that Eliot and Pound inflicted on 
The Waste Land, no matter how radical or unruly that poem had seemed in 1922: 
 
The poem suffered in its very success.  It had been cut and reorganized to succeed, 
and had lost in its conscious form whatever unconscious form had made for the 
confusion of sequence, the “miscellaneous pieces” that did not seem to fit.  “These 
fragments I have shored against my ruins.”  Out of whatever real ruin that threatened, 
Pound and Eliot had agreed finally upon the monumental artifice of a ruin, a ruin with 
an outline. “Complimenti, you bitch,” Pound writes Eliot...  (HD, 225) 
 
Thus, even The Wasteland, for Duncan, becomes an exercise in repression and containment; 
an artificial ruin that is ultimately too well made and too carefully policed. In the larger 
economy of the H. D. Book’s rhetoric, the text of  The Waste Land itself becomes a 
hysterical, feminized body which Pound and Eliot must sanitize as they might, (with Pound 
displacing onto Eliot the castration he finds the latter’s triumph to have inflicted on him, as 
his salutation demonstrates).19 As against this modernist cutting, however, Duncan 
everywhere proposes a writing of flow and spillage, of inclusion and inclusiveness that is not 
utopian but rather a heterological vision of necessary mess, disorder, inconsistency, or, to use 
another word that Duncan harps on, “imperfection.” Indeed, Duncan will reproach H. D.’s 
early imagist poetry for its intolerance of “imperfection,” the openness to which he likens to 
“our admission in consciousness of what must be included in our humanity, in our poetic art, 
in our history” (HD, 393)—the Freudian “permission” again.  
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Impersonality, Fantasy, Myth 
 
 Duncan’s procedure of revision without “correction” is not only crucial to the entire 
Freudian poetics he maps throughout The H.D. Book; it also implies a view of temporality of 
clear importance with regard to the early modernist aesthetic ideology with which Duncan is 
grappling.  Freud’s model of “working through,” or of the irreconcilable coexistence of 
differing temporal moments within the unconscious, and Duncan’s literary appropriation of 
it, violate one of the central precepts of Imagism:  the primacy of the “instant of time,” and 
by extension, the very concept of what an “intellectual or emotional complex” might be.20 
This is central not only to Duncan’s own poetics, but to how he reads H.D. in the alternative 
modernism he constructs in The H. D. Book.  For the “time” that Duncan is at pains to 
elaborate throughout the text is very largely analytic time—here, less the Nachträglichkeit of 
trauma, than the temporality of deferral, repetition, and delay of the analytic sessions, the 
structural repetitions of the working-through.  In a striking formulation, discussing the early 
meetings of Helen and Achilles in H.D.’s Helen in Egypt, Duncan writes:   
 . . . where the man and the woman huddle over a fire in the night on the beach, a 
gathering begins.  This is not the magic of symbols, but the magic that goes on in the 
practices of psychoanalysis—the magic of associations until a host of incidents, 
impersonations, tendencies precipitate what is called the “content” and in the 
precipitation the crisis.  Not those streams of consciousness that in Proust’s magic 
opened out from one impression vistas of the past recaptured; but as if this magic 
were reversed and all the glowing and modulated fabric were to be called in from its 
dispersion to increase the pressures of a single moment. (HD, 602-3). 
 
This remarkable passage reverses not only the parable of Proust’s madeleine but an entire 
paradigmatic modernist economy found in Joyce’s “epiphanies” and not least, in Pound’s 
theory of the “luminous detail.” Rather than locate the single element that “governs 
knowledge as the switchboard governs an electric circuit” and is “swift and easy of 
transmission,”21 as in Pound’s synecdochic theory, for Duncan it is the cumbersome process 
of accretion itself and the slippage between “details” in the network of associations that 
produce not “knowledge” but rather the “crisis”: that is, literally, the moment of decision. In 
such a conception, no one detail can ever be “luminous”; it is accretion or “gathering” that is 
productive.22  Such a passage speaks volumes about Duncan’s own dilatory, associative, 
repetitive writing practices (notably but not only in The H. D. Book), but it is also 
fundamental to how Duncan returns to the question of myth, the relation of myth to the 
political, and the implications of psychoanalysis for both.  Rather than psychoanalyzing 
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myth, as both Freud and Jung do—as well as Duncan in other places—here psychoanalysis 
becomes the form of myth, or a model of mythical association.  This is because Duncan’s 
account arises in the context of his discussion of H.D.’s own feminist appropriation of myth 
in Helen in Egypt.  There, H.D. takes her departure from Stesichorus’ Pallinode, according to 
which “Helen was never in Troy. She had been transposed or translated from Greece into 
Egypt.  Helen of Troy was a phantom, substituted for the real Helen, by jealous deities. The 
Greeks and the Trojans alike fought for an illusion.”23 H. D. instead tells the story of the 
“real” Helen in Egypt, where she encounters Achilles.  It is they who are “huddled over the 
fire”24 at the beginning of H. D.’s telling of the story, where they will talk of Isis, Thetis—
Achilles’ mother—and above all, hieroglyphs and reading.  
 The air of familiarity in both H.D.’s staging and Duncan’s recasting derives from the 
participation of this scene in the myth of myth-telling itself.  As Jean-Luc Nancy has made 
plain, the very definition of myths as such occurs within a greater framing myth of  “a group 
of people gathered together, with someone telling them a story”25 which is the “story of their 
origins, of where they come from or how they come from the Origin itself.”26  This scene of 
myth is itself mythical, Nancy reminds us: “The humanity represented in the scene of the 
myth, humanity being born to itself in producing the myth. . . forms a scene no less fantastic 
than any primal scene.  All myths are primal scenes, all primal scenes are myths (it is Freud 
once again who plays the role of inventor).”27  Nancy is not using “myth” here in the loose 
sense of something which is not empirically true; rather, he is stressing the fact that myths 
and primal scenes both are tasked with explaining an origin as part of their structure.  Behind 
Nancy is quite possibly the work of Jean Laplanche and J.-B. Pontalis on fantasy. In their 
classic Fantasme originaire, fantasme des origines,origines du fantasme they stress that 
psychoanalysis must interest itself not only in the “origins” of fantasy, but in the 
circumstance that the function of fantasy is to provide origin-stories.  They write, “In their 
very content, in their theme (primal scene, castration, seduction) originary fantasies also point 
to this retroactive postulate: they go back to the origin.  Like myths, they claim to offer a 
representation of and a solution to what for the child remain major enigmas. . . . Fantasy of 
origins: in the primal scene, the origin of the individual is represented; in seduction fantasies, 
it is the origin and bursting forth of sexuality; in castration fantasies, the origin of sexual 
difference”28  The scene Nancy describes, then, is in some ways the primal myth: the myth of 
the origins of the mythic mode, which itself explains origins.  It is in this context that the full 
significance of Duncan’s reversal of the primal mythic scene can truly be measured, as well 
as how Duncan’s myth relates to those Tiffany denounces in Pound. Duncan mines a similar 
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demystifying vein when, in reference to Hitler as well as Lyndon Johnson during the Vietnam 
War, he writes “Where history becomes myth, men are moved not toward the ends they 
desire but toward their fates, the ends they deserve” (CE, 153). And against this, the mythic 
community for Duncan is not one united in its adherence to an auto-theorizing tale, as in 
Nancy’s evocation of the classic scene, but one that dissipates all tales centrifugally through 
conversation, exchange, and forms of working-through and acting-out, as indicated by terms 
like “impersonations” and “incidents.”  This helps indicate how Duncan can conceive of the 
communal or communist poem as something other than “self-expression.”  As Laplanche and 
Pontalis point out in the same article, whereas in day-dreams, dominated by the ego, the 
“scenario is essentially written in the first-person, and the place of the subject clearly marked 
and unchanging,” on the other hand in primal or “originary” fantasy there is an “absence of 
subjectivation which goes hand in hand with the presence of the subject within the scene,”29 
divided between unstable, partial, and variable identifications, as indicated in Freud’s famous 
“A Child is Being Beaten.” Originary fantasy, then, is a scene or staging, in which the subject 
is implicated without having a stable part: if the subject is always “present in the fantasy,” 
she can be so “in a desubjective form, that is to say, in the very syntax of the sequence in 
question” and this because the prime function of fantasy is not the representation of the 
desired object but the staging of desire.30  
 Following from Laplanche and Pontalis, we might say that Duncan’s poetics strive to 
present the fantasy rather than the day-dream, to distance themselves from the “ego” which 
Laplanche and Pontalis point to as the ballast of the diurnal reverie. Duncan writes: 
The “our,” “my,” “us,” “we,” “I,” “me” of the poet’s work, and the other “you,” 
“your,” “they,” “them” are pronouns of a play, members or persons of a world drama 
in division.  They are no more at liberty, no more seek liberty than they pursue 
happiness, for the sense of poetic justice or form that is history reveals them all as 
actors or chorus of a work that now we see is a self-creative drama at play. (HD, 559-
60). 
 
The reflections on liberty link with a statement made shortly before, where Duncan writes “ 
‘Liberty’ too is a demand of the anti-poetic. The poet cannot take liberties in the poem. For 
just there, where the arbitrary, self-expressive or self-saving, where the self-conscious voice 
comes, the idiotes, private howl or moan or the urbane sophisticated tone breaks or takes over 
from the communal voice” (HD, 559).  The reference to the “private howl” along with the 
reticence regarding “liberty” might be taken as a distancing from Ginsberg.  Here, Duncan 
seems closer to the poetics of dictation of his friend Jack Spicer, and the Eliotic impersonality 
that lies behind it.  As with Spicer, at root is a consideration of the relationship between 
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“freedom” and what lies beyond consciousness and the Ego, in a reflection which breaks with 
some of the naive utopian strains of Surrealist or Beat valorization of the unconscious and the 
overcoming of repression. Duncan writes: 
Free association, it was once called; but Freudian analyses have shown that 
associations are not free but binding.  In the process of personation the events about 
us are transformed into knots, possibility is tied to possibility until a net is woven 
writhing with the psychic energies that before had been oceanic. (HD, 608). 
 
Echoing Eliot on free verse, one might say that for Duncan no association is free for the 
analyst who wants to do a good job.  But the emphasis on binding networks of association 
and the hysterical “personations” which they both produce and are produced by offers a path 
for Duncan to skirt the alternative between writing like the “dead man” that Eliot and Spicer 
both require, or writing from the “self-possession” of the commodified bourgeois ego which 
Duncan everywhere denounces.  Jean-Michel Rabaté has recently stressed how apposite 
Pound’s nickname of “Possum” was for Eliot, as the implications of the latter’s writing 
strategy with regard to “tradition” was to “play possum” or pretend to be dead.31  For Spicer, 
this pose became earnest, as his theories of dictation call for a subjective death in many ways 
more severe than Eliot’s. Appealing to Orpheus but structurally homologous with much of 
Beckett, the poet’s proper position is often defined as that of speaking from beyond the grave, 
or from Hell.  “Going into Hell so many times tears it / Which explains poetry”32 Spicer 
writes, and in After Lorca, a book of “personations” if ever there was one, he equates the 
failure of poetry with the instant the poet “ceases to be a dead man.”33  For Duncan, one of 
the major questions is how to move beyond the thanatocratic poetics of Eliot and Spicer 
without falling into an equally problematic facile affirmationism of a “life” which would 
amount to the mirrors of misrecognition under which the “idiotic” pursues its regime. As we 
shall see, what both of these models preclude is the relationship to “volition” necessary for 
political action, all the more important as for Duncan it is precisely the post-capitalist un-self-
possessed communal poet who can occupy the structural place of the ossified dead man to 
which Eliot and Spicer resort. To enable this transition, a kitsch version of myth under the 
aegis of psychoanalysis becomes crucial. 
 
 Fairy Tales 
 
 Duncan sketches this in his decisive essay, “The Truth and Life of Myth,” composed 
during the transparently epochal years of 1967 and 1968.  There, Duncan argues that “Jung 
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thinks theosophically, where Freud thinks mythologically” (CE,182), though by the former 
term Duncan highlights elements that other poets might happily champion as “mythopoetic.” 
For Duncan, however, it is precisely Jung’s insistence on “myth” in an exalted sense that 
impedes any true mythic thinking. Duncan evokes the Jungian privileging of the archetype 
and “deep image” and its attendant scorn for the “little dreams” of Freud, whose meanings 
reside in the “interests of lower organs and orders” (CE,182), rather than their sublimation 
into grander meanings.34 For Duncan, the Freudian paradigm of the dream asserts “all parts 
belong, no member is to be dismissed as trivial or mistaken.  Mistakes themselves mark the 
insistence of meanings in other meanings” (CE, 183).  In the larger economy of the essay, 
however,  this distinction between the Jungian and Freudian approach to dreams crucially 
echoes an earlier distinction between traditional acceptations of “myth” as opposed to 
“fairytale.” Whereas myth for Duncan offers protagonists who are “movers of the universe 
and initiators of the first mysteries” and implies poets, makers and tellers who are “sages or 
mages more famous than kings” (CE, 163), on the other hand “folk and fairytale have their 
home in the gossip of old wives and little children, [in] stories about the cooking-hearth and 
the nursery bedside” (CE, 163): “Back of fairytale is the despised life of the peasant” (CE, 
163).  Moreover, the “lowly folktale” which Coleridge was eager to distinguish from myth 
and demote to “Fancy” (CE, 163) is on the side of that “other Christ” whom Duncan is not 
ready to discount: “...the Jesus of folktale and legend, the very fairytale hero in the New 
Testament who is a lowly carpenter, an unrecognized king, whose kingdom, like fairyland, is 
not of this world, and whose disciples are despised men and women” (CE, 164).  Duncan 
quotes Emperor Julian’s disdain for Christianity as the religion of “contemptible men” such 
as “innkeepers, publicans, dancers, and others of the like” (CE, 176) and repeats that phrase 
verbatim when presenting the Jungian disdain for the “lower organs and orders” of the 
Freudian dream.  We end up with Freud and Christ as against Jung and classical Myth. 
 Now, the recusal of transcendent mythic grandeur as the proper domain for 
psychoanalysis and its replacement with the domestic space of the nursery, primary care, 
women, children, and the poor is consonant with Duncan’s political reading of 
psychoanalysis in this essay as the discourse that gives voice to the “language of madmen, 
children, dreams, and of myths, that had been thought unintelligible” (CE, 183).35 But by 
moving from a mythopoetics to what one might call a fairypoetics, it also outlines a poetics 
and psychoanalysis embedded in kitsch. Daniel Tiffany considers the “fairy way of writing” 
to be a major kitsch component, and outlines its links to anxieties about class distinction as 
well as its mobilization by queer poetic coteries in a manner that systematizes many of the 
 13 
insights Duncan was developing in the 60s, both in “The Truth of Life and Myth” and in The 
H. D. Book. The latter work, which contains a significant excursus on the “fairy,” prepares 
the terrain by way of a remarkable queering of some of Pound’s core poetics as formulated in 
The Spirit of Romance, notably its chapter “Psychology and the Troubadours.”36 Crucial to 
Pound’s mythos is the postulate that Troubadour lyric arises from the sexual mysteries that 
the Albigensian Crusades had been appointed to destroy. While not entirely disputing that, in 
a remarkable sequence Duncan patiently and gradually specifies in what these forbidden acts 
consisted. The decisive moment in Duncan’s argument is the unveiling of an etymology that 
is still accepted today, and which cuts to the heart of Pound’s foundational belief in the “light 
from Eleusis,” or erotic mysteries, as the secret core of modern European poetic culture. 
Duncan writes “An echo of the Church’s accusations against the Cathars or Bogomils—they 
were, originally, Bulgars—is left in our word today for one of these forbidden sexual acts 
that is still outside the law of the established State: buggery” (HD, 92).  This becomes the 
central scene, act, and desire in the Provençal poetry of love, which Pound places at the root 
of modern lyric. 
 Additionally, Duncan’s queering of Pound’s medievalist erotic mysteries is followed 
by a like queering of Eliot’s use of medieval material (though in contradistinction to Pound, 
Eliot is not named in this discussion).  This is accomplished through a discussion of the 
words “fay” and “fairy,” the first historically related to “illusions or enchantments” and 
therefore linked by Duncan to Pound’s theories of the poetic image. “The casting of the 
image is high fairy, phanopoeia” (HD, 125), Duncan writes, borrowing Pound’s famous 
term, and thereby the “hardness” of imagistic or objectivist facticity is rethought as witchcraft 
or fairy dust.  But Duncan’s references to Jessie Weston and the “Celtic genius” in the 
context of fairy lore (HD, 125) also allow this dust to cover the Arthurian Romance so crucial 
to the early Eliot.37 Much turns on the etymology of “fay,” which Duncan accurately traces 
back to the Latin word “fata”—that is, the Fates of classical antiquity—allowing him to bring 
the myths of Fairyland into still closer contact to motifs of the underworld, ghosts, and the 
dead. Following from this, Duncan is able by way of allusion to the slang associations of fay 
and fairy to suggest a Queer Deep Structure inhabiting fairy lore and therefore the grounding 
myths deployed by The Waste Land.  These arguments for a subterranean queerness at the 
heart of the Medievalism so central to Eliot and Pound are made over the course of thirty 
pages in which Pound’s Cantos feature as a crucial intertext throughout. It is not coincidental 
that it is with a reference to the beginning of the Cantos and the “phantoms of Odysseus and 
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his descent to the dead” that Duncan inaugurates a startling synthesis that is a crux of his 
entire project, and must be quoted at length: 
 
 In the fairy-world, the otherness or alien nearness of the dead and of hidden 
elements, of illusion and delusion in our daily life, the witchcraft of phantasy [note 
the Greek root this word shares with Pound’s “phanopeia”] and the bewitched 
obsessions of madness, all the psychological dangers, combined as if they were the 
heart’s wish. The specter that haunts Europe [that is, communism] Marx had called 
the hidden wish of the human spirit in history. The traumatic image Freud had called 
the repressed wish of the psyche, the primal scene.  The underground uprises into the 
place of what is above-board.  Justice demands it. The verso appears, so vivid that we 
see the surface of things had faded in the sunlight, and what we most feared we must 
now become. The living seem dead and the dead most alive. The words fey, fay, and 
fairy had a meaning I was to learn among schoolmates that in the common usage 
superseded all other meaning: “queer,” “perverted,” “effeminate.”  Old concepts of 
sodomy and of shamanism—the cult that Orpheus was said to have brought from the 
forest world of the North to corrupt Greece, a cult of mediumship, poetry, and 
homosexuality—carry over into our vulgar sense of the word fairy, where men’s fear 
and mistrust of a sexual duplicity are most active. (HD, 127-128). 
 
Here we see the Marxist programme of liberation, the Freudian combat against repression, 
Pound’s modernist project, and queer sexualities all embedded in the fairy story of Medieval 
romance, now ripped from the hetero-normative and regulatory roles both Pound and Eliot 
sought to ascribe to it in the foundational moments of modernism. In this way, a queer and 
kitsch Medievalism—a fairy story and fairy tale—becomes the motor of Marxist-Freudian 
liberation, often through the medium of hysteria. The specter haunting Europe’s regimes of 
exploitation takes the form of the hysteric and the fairy.38  And these minor forms associated 
with minor figures—women, children, peasants—crucially offer a form of historical 
transmission and reproduction thought outside the traditional models of what might be called 
semination, whether Whitman’s dissemination or Pound’s broadcasting (which literally 
means the sowing of seed). The scandalous, unstable and unbounded speaking body of 
hysteria counters phallocentric metaphors of insemination as the projection of form—the 
reproductive stamp or brand on feminine matter.39 Here, it is the matter that speaks.  But 
Duncan soon was called to speak himself, as the social and public space available to 
progressive political discourse changed radically during the early sixties. Living in San 
Francisco and with a close connection to the University of California at Berkeley, where he 
had been a student in the forties, Duncan found himself at one of the crucibles where the 
possibility of turning poetic interventions into political ones seemed most viable. Duncan did 




Bending the Bow: Protest, Law, Volition  
 
The promises and pitfalls of the poetics Duncan was working out in the sixties become 
strikingly visible in his 1968 collection, Bending the Bow.  Although the latest poems in the 
book date from 1966 and thus stop short of the “summer of love” of 1967 as well as 1968, the 
book is clearly located by Duncan himself within that context of radicalism. For example, his 
introduction, dated October-November 1967, contains a first section titled “The War” and 
presents as a pivot a scene of police and military violence inflicted on antiwar protestors, one 
which would not be unfamiliar to the UC Berkeley community today.  Just as importantly, 
poems throughout the book address the anti-Vietnam War movement from its inceptions, and 
what at the time was an even more unlikely source of political upheaval: the Free Speech 
Movement at Berkeley, initiator of the sea-change in the US political scene constituted by the 
emergence of university students as such as major political actors.  Indeed, in thinking the 
periodicity of the 60s in the US, there are very few more important factors than this largely 
unprecedented eruption of student activism as a dominant political and social question.40  But 
whereas Thomas Pynchon, for example, in The Crying of Lot 49 registers this decisive 
moment for our contemporaneity in a work now considered as a major template of the so-
called “post-modern,” Duncan can seem surprisingly retrograde. The poetic mode he 
elaborates to address these developments consists to a striking degree of a pastiche of Pound, 
and thus, is doubly kitsch: first because of the kitsch core of much of Pound’s poetics, and 
second, because the “personating” phoniness of pastiche generally is in and of itself a 
foundational element of kitsch.  In fact, to a considerable degree Duncan’s political writing in 
the book consists of two dominant styles, sometimes used separately, at others in uneasy 
cohabitation: a Poundian mode clearly modelled on his “Hell” Cantos, and a minor 
archaicizing “fairy story” mode, often featuring the Christic elements we saw above in “The 
Truth and Life of Myth.”  Underlying both is the problem of collective action and individual 
agency in relationship to it, all the more pressing as at the heart of Duncan’s poetics is the 
suspicion of bourgeois affirmationist subjectivity we have seen above.  Thus, “Earth’s Winter 
Song” combines Poundian Dantesque pastiche in lines like these: 
 
  Wearing the unctuous mask of Johnson, 
from his ass-hole emerging the hed of Humphrey, 
 16 
he [the old dragon] bellows and begins over Asia and America 
the slaughter of the innocents and the reign of wrath. [“hed” is Duncan’s spelling, and 
his idiosyncratic usages will be retained in all citations]41 
 
with Christian kitsch as seen here: 42 
 
   - the few 
frightened shepherds – the three 
magi or magicians seeing in the Child 
the child of their lore – Joseph 
whose faith is father, and the girl 
whose virginity engenders –and the new 
lord of the true life, of Love  ･ (CLP, 377) 
 
If such lines can be saved at all, and it is doubtful, it is only by placing them in the context of 
Duncan’s argument in “The Truth and Life of Myth” that positions Christianity on the side of 
domestic, collective social practice and also crucially social parapraxis, given the links 
between fairytale and Freudian dream-reading he establishes therein. In other words, here the 
Christ story needs to function as the anti-Mythic rather than the arch-mythic or archetypal in 
order for Duncan’s political parable to work, for the poem is not in praise of mythic 
individual heroism but rather collective acts of resistance and the courage of the weak (for 
which the rhetoric is high kitsch):  “The beautiful young men and women! / Standing against 
the war their courage / has made a green place in my heart” (CLP, 376).  These in their 
collectivity stand not only against the powers of the war, but also against the properly Mythic 
voice of judgement which speaks with a Dantean/Poundian rhetoric of grandeur and disdain 
in the same poem.  The poem, then, is symptomatically torn between these two modes, which 
echo another division much of the book is at pains to reconcile: that between an essentially 
communal vision of labor and exchange implying a collectively derived subject both more 
primary and beyond the ego and its “self-possession,” and a vision of political agency and 
activism which is necessarily voluntarist to some extent.  In “Earth’s Winter Song,” the 
Christic language will also be called upon to smooth over this disjunction: “O the green 
spring-tide / of individual volition for the communal good, / the Christ-promise of 
brotherhood....” (CLP, 377). Elsewhere, however the “communal good” will be seen less as 
an agglomeration of the individuals who comprise it and more as a way of thinking beyond 
the category of the individual, and the notion of “volition” will not be so quickly reduced to 
that of conscious will and mastery.43 
 In fact, the word “volition” appears as early as the volume’s introduction (but also as 
late, as the introduction was an a posteriori synthesizing production), and there in the 
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contradictory guise it wears in much of Duncan’s work, as Duncan writes about the protestors 
facing the police who close in to disperse them: “. . . we, under own orders, moved each to sit 
or lie upon the ground. . . the individual volition of a non-violent action” (CLP, 294). Note 
that “orders,” another key term for Duncan, tends to go with rather than against “volition,” 
casting the latter as an acquiescence which is nevertheless not a subservience.  Again echoing 
discussions of “liberty” in “The Truth and Life of Myth,” in the Introduction Duncan writes 
“our liberties are obediences of another order that moved us” (CLP, 294). However, one of 
the Introduction’s concluding strains complicates this by stressing “interferences” (CLP, 300) 
and claiming that the ultimate obediences paradoxically derive from what is “out of order” as 
Duncan punningly puts it— that is, a work’s discordant elements:  “Were all in harmony to 
our ears, we would dwell in the dreadful smugness in which our mere human rationality 
relegates what it cannot cope with to the ‘irrational,’ as if the totality of creation were without 
ratios. Praise then the interruption of our composure, the image that comes to fit we cannot 
account for, the juncture in the music that appears discordant” (CLP, 300).44 Here, once 
again, Duncan praises the “uprising” (to use the title of one of the book’s most famous 
political poems, and a term Duncan also explicitly associates with emanations from the 
unconscious and sexuality) that disturbs the ego’s sense of self-possession and mastery, yet 
he distances these disturbances from postulations of contingency or liberty. “That Freedom 
and the Law are identical” Duncan writes elsewhere in Bending the Bow (CLP, 360),45 while 
in no way suggesting a totalitarian submission of the will as the ultimate freedom from the 
drives, as in so much fascist rhetoric. Rather, for Duncan, the unconscious would seem to 
consist of its own form of law, or “binding” as we saw in the passage from the H.D. Book 
discussed above, but not one which authorizes irresponsibility.  Many of these problems 
come to a head in Duncan’s poem about the Free Speech Movement and the administration of 




 This poem, in part an excoriating assault on University of California Chancellor Clark 
Kerr, also refers by way of the word “multiversity” to Kerr’s most famous concept, 
elaborated in his extremely influential work of 1963, The Uses of the University.  Duncan’s 
isolation of this concept was prescient: by the end of the decade, when student protests had 
become routine throughout the globe, Kerr’s book was increasingly located as a prime 
ideological exponent of the shifts in the structure and function of the university to which 
 18 
students were responding—at least in part— in wealthier countries, not least France in 1968.  
For example,  Guy Debord’s Society of the Spectacle of 1967—exactly concurrent with 
Bending the Bow—points to Kerr in theorizing how “culture turned fully into 
merchandise”—entailing the commodification of university work— must of necessity go on 
to become the leading consumer good of the society of the spectacle.46  Calling Kerr “one of 
the most advanced ideologues” behind this tendency, Debord explicitly mentions The Uses of 
the University.  If he doesn’t cite it directly, the statistics he refers to and the content which 
he summarizes make clear what passage he had in mind. There, Kerr writes that the 
university’s new (by which he means post-war) imbrication with the industrial sector makes 
it “. . . a prime instrument of national purpose.  This is new.  This is the essence of the 
transformation now engulfing our universities. . . . Basic to this transformation is the growth 
of the ‘knowledge industry,’ which is coming to permeate government and business. . .”47  
And here follow, in Kerr’s original, the main elements of the passage which Debord 
translates and summarizes, showing the acuity of them both:  “The production, distribution, 
and consumption of ‘knowledge’ in all its forms is said to account for 29 percent of gross 
national product. . . . What the railroads did for the second half of the last century and the 
automobile for the first half of this century may be done for the second half of this century by 
the knowledge industry.”48  
 A few years after Debord’s analysis, Kerr’s vision was again a leading target of a 
Marxist critique of the modern university, though one coming from a very different 
intellectual tradition.  This is one levelled by a group of students and lecturers working under 
the guidance of Marxist historian E. P. Thompson, then Reader in Labour History at the 
University of Warwick which, in 1970, became the site of an important student protest and 
occupation, triggered by the students’ thwarted desire for a Student Union building that 
would be fully under their control. Noting that the “new university” of Warwick was from its 
inception founded in collaboration with the local barons of industry (in this case, automotive) 
the Warwick group commented as follows in the still classic Warwick University Ltd49:   
 
 One prime social function of a university is to inquire freely and to criticize 
freely.  And the more managed, the more planned, the more ‘efficient’ the rest of 
society grows, the more important this function becomes. . . .  
 One of the pervasive myths of the mid-twentieth century is that with the 
replacement of the old-style entrepreneur and tycoon by the propertyless manager, 
there has come about a qualitative change to “managerial” capitalism.  The new 
manager is seen as running the system ‘in the national interest’ rather than in the 
interests of the propertied class. . . .  
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 Where does the University fit into this picture?  Professor Clark Kerr, who ran 
the Berkeley campus of the University of California50 where many have located the 
origins of the student movement, answered this question in his book The Uses of the 
University.  The University provides skilled manpower and facilities for basic 
research.  And it produces the culture and ideology of the pluralist system. . . .  
 But the world of industry is emphatically not a world of a neutral technocracy 
working for the benefit of all.”51  
 
The institution derided by Debord along with the Warwick collective is one that Kerr, in an 
attempt at wit, had dubbed the “multiversity” in the book to which they both refer.  By 
“multiversity” Kerr meant to stress that this new structure was now clearly torn in several 
different directions by various forces whose interests could no longer be seen to be aligned.  
No longer an “organism” as in older views, Kerr claimed it must be seen as a “mechanism—a 
series of processes producing a series of results—a mechanism held together by 
administrative rules and powered by money.”52  Kerr, who considered himself a progressive 
liberal, retains a responsibly critical position towards the mulitversity throughout his 
discussion of it, but in an ideological maneuver that both Debord and Thompson would have 
easily unmasked, he presents it quite simply as an inevitability:  “. . . it  . . . has its reality 
rooted in the logic of history.  It is an imperative rather than a reasoned choice among elegant 
alternatives.”  In light of this, Kerr ruefully suggests, “ ‘The Idea of a Multiversity’ has no 
bard to sing its praises.”53  Naturally, Kerr had not foreseen the extravagantly bardic Robert 
Duncan, who was certainly ready if not to praise at least to sing.  
 Like Debord and Thompson, Duncan seems at least to have had a glance at The Uses 
of the University.  Therein Kerr writes in the forced jauntiness which dominates much of the 
book, “It is sometimes said that the American multiversity president is a two-faced character.  
This is not so.  If he were, he could not survive.  He is a many-faced character, in the sense 
that he must face in many directions at once while contriving to turn his back on no important 
group.”54  It’s hard not to think Duncan had that passage in mind in his opening lines: 
 
 not men    but heads of the hydra 
 
   his false faces in which 
         authority lies 
 
 hired minds of private interests 
 
  over  us 
 
here:  Kerr (behind him, heads of the Bank of America 
  the Tribune, 
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   heads of usury, heads of war) 
 
      the worm’s   mouthpiece   spreads 
 
           what it wishes   its own   
false news : . . . (CLP, 356-7) 
 
 
 The surprisingly contemporary phrase “false news” will go on to describe how the 
FSM has been erroneously presented by the Oakland Tribune, mentioned above, as well as 
other unnamed sources, and the poem also lists forms of hypocrisy and bad faith operative 
among the administrators and faculty, for example, “The aging Professor, translator of 
fashionable surrealist revolutionaries, muttering — / They shld not be permitted to be 
students; they shld be in the army” (CLP, 357-8; Italics and abbreviations Duncan’s).  
Throughout, however, one of Duncan’s major concerns is the question of community and 
collective action, specifically the “hidden community”—both within and without the 
university— that he chastises the UC administrators for denying when they claim that the 
FSM is restricted to only a tiny number of students.55  This is fundamental, as the poem 
specifies “Where there is no commune, / the individual volition has no ground” yet also 
“Where there is no individual freedom, the commune / is falsified” (CLP, 358).  However, 
the ending of the poem indicates that Duncan is after something more elusive than a classic 
liberal balance between the needs of the individual and those of the community.56  The poem 
concludes like this: 
 
Each day     the last day;     each day   the 
 
 beginning     the first word 
 
   door of the day or law awakening we create, 
 
  vowels sung in a field in mid-morning 
 
      awakening the heart from its oppressions. 
 
 
Evil  “referred to the root of up, over” 
simulacra of law that wld over-rule 
          the Law man’s inner nature seeks, 
 
coils about them,   not men but 
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   heads and armors of the worm    office is 
 
There being no common good, no commune, 
no communion, outside the freedom of 
 
 individual volition. (CLP, 359) 
 
 
These rather mysterious lines receive some elucidation from the H.D. Book, where Duncan 
refers to the same etymology of “evil,” and writes that evil may be defined as any “. . . power 
over us of outer or inner compulsion.  As the power and presumption of authority by the state 
has increased in every nation, we are ill with it, for it surrounds us and, where it does not 
openly conscript, seeks by advertising, by education, by dogma, or by terror, to seduce, 
enthrall, mould, command, or coerce our inner will or conscience or inspiration to its own 
uses” (HD, 335).  “Evil,” therefore, is the false law, the simulacrum that we submit to.  The 
problem, however, is that for Duncan there is also a true law to which we must submit, and 
neither the true nor the false can be located safely on one side or the other of the division 
between inner and outer.  If even our “conscience” and “inspiration” can serve evil, then 
clearly evil can assert itself in the very form of “volition,” and all the more as the true 
volition which Duncan would valorize itself implies an acquiescence or acceptance of an 
“inner law” which nevertheless seems transcendent of the individual, who must imagine her 
volition as a product of neither “self-possession” nor inner compulsion. And this is all the 
more fraught as the “orders” which we give to and accept from ourselves to achieve this true 
volition are interlocked with what is “out of order”—with the “interference” or the 
“dissatisfaction in all orders from which the restless ordering of our poetry comes” (CLP, 
300). In other words, for Duncan the “communal” less designates a group of individuals than 
it names a transcendent structure from which the “laws” and orders to which volition says 
“yes” derive.  Because the “inner compulsion” can be as fraudulent or as evil as the outer, 
“volition” only functions as a concept in the context of the radical beyond of self-possession 
represented by the community. While unequivocally writing protest poetry, then, Duncan 
constantly retreats from a traditional affirmation of the subject of protest. Tiffany, referring to 
kitsch’s reliance on the “conventional” and “formulaic” associates its mode with the social 
and claims “what kitsch expresses lies beyond personal experience,”57 and Duncan also, in 
his kitsch writing of  “volition,” attempts to parallel a bracketing of the lyric exceptionalism 
based on self-possession and self-expression with a rethinking of the subject of political 
resistance along similar lines.  This position is precarious, and can easily be accused of 
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quietism given its reticence regarding affirmation.  Indeed, within the history of the 
protracted and violent rupture with Denise Levertov over their respective protest poems, 
Levertov made just this sort of accusation against Duncan. Stephen Fredman summarizes her 
position as implying that as a Freudian “Duncan’s obsession with the unconscious and the 
shadowy causes him to devalue individual volition and commitment.”58  But especially 
noteworthy is that the fundamental point of contention in this Californian spat—the relative 
weighting of conscious, volitionist political activity as opposed to the productive powers of 
unconscious structures—would be at the heart at one of the central discussions around the 
meaning of May 1968 in France. 
 
May 1968: Structures in the Streets 
 
 I refer here to the famous debates surrounding the legendary graffito and slogan, 
“Structures don’t take to the streets,” allegedly written on a blackboard in the occupied 
Sorbonne during the events themselves. Its very existence there is somewhat ironic in and of 
itself, for as Élisabeth Roudinesco, Frédérique Matonti and others have pointed out, in the 
run-up to 1968 structuralism was largely associated with left-wing and anti-establishment 
thought, —as exemplified above all by Althusser, Barthes, and Foucault—and was most 
certainly unwelcome in the French university establishment, at whose center this derogatory 
graffito was written.  This irony finds its explanation, however, in the fact that other 
important elements of the radical left contested structuralism, denouncing it as an ideology 
which necessarily downplayed the role of conscious choice and decision-making as source of 
action.  Sherry Turkle asserts that “ ‘Down with structuralism’ became a student slogan” in 
‘68, and discusses how more generally, structuralist premises were seen as “antithetical in 
spirit to the voluntarist flavor of the May uprising which asserted the primacy of desires and 
ideas.”59  Indeed, among the leading participants of ’68, the Situationists were very decided 
opponents of structuralism, which Guy Debord had attacked in La société du spectacle, 
associating it as an academic discipline with many of the same tendencies he found in the 
university as imagined by Clark Kerr.  He somewhat predictably dismisses structuralism as a 
form of ahistorical reification:  “Le point de vue où se place la pensée anti-historique du 
structuralisme est celui de l’éternelle présence d’un système qui n’a jamais été créé et qui ne 
finira jamais” (“Structuralism’s anti-historical thinking is based on the perspective of the 
eternal presence of a system which was never created and will never come to an end”; my 
translation).60 But moreover and more suggestively, Debord argues that the emphasis that 
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structuralism places on “codes” is only an outgrowth and symptom of the forms of mediation 
inherent to the society of the spectacle, rather than a transhistorical, universal tool for 
analyzing them: “Le structuralisme est la pensée garantie par l’Etat. . . . Sa façon d’étudier le 
code des messages en lui-même n’est que le produit, et la reconnaissance, d’une société où la 
communication existe sous forme d’une cascade de signaux hiérarchiques” (“Structuralism is 
thought with a government warranty. . . . Its manner of studying the code of the messages in 
and of itself is only the product and the awareness of a society in which communication 
exists in the form of a cascade of hierarchically ordered signals”; my translation).61  Opposed 
to the allegedly subjectless version of history offered by structuralism, Debord, echoing 
Freud’s “Where it was there I must go” asserts: “Là où était le ça économique doit venir le 
je” (“There where the economic id was, the Ego/I must come”; my translation).62 
But as is well known, the phrase “les structures ne descendent pas dans la rue” also 
had an interesting after-life that extended beyond the events themselves.  On February 22, 
1969, in the discussion that followed Michel Foucault’s epochal talk, “What is an Author?” 
Lucien Goldman produced that very Sorbonne slogan as evidence when arguing contra 
Foucault that people, not structures, made history.63  Also in attendance, however, was 
Jacques Lacan, who responded as follows: “Je ne considère pas qu’il soit d’aucune façon 
légitime d’avoir écrit que les structures ne descendent pas dans la rue, parce que, s’il y a 
quelque chose que démontrent les événements de mai, c’est précisément la descente dans la 
rue des structures. Le fait qu’on l’écrive à la place même où s’est opérée cette descente dans 
la rue ne prouve rien d’autre que, simplement, ce qui est très souvent, et même le plus 
souvent, interne à ce qu’on appelle l’acte, c’est qu’il se méconnaît lui- même” (“I do not 
believe it is in any way legitimate to write that structures don’t take to the streets, because if 
there’s one thing that the events of May have shown, it is precisely the taking to the streets of 
structures.  And the fact that this phrase was written at the very site where such a thing took 
place proves nothing, except what is so often, and even most often, integral to what one calls 
the “act”—that this act misrecognizes itself”; my translation).64 At stake here is the very 
relationship between the unconscious and political action, as well as the relationship of 
language, as both structure and act, to both.  And for Lacan, the slogan that is used to 
discredit structuralism along with his own form of psychoanalysis is nothing other than a 
striking example of the mystifications of the ego and by extension, of the ego-psychology 
that psychoanalysis must always resist: this might be the reign of the misrecognizing “je” that 
Debord seems to call for, in fact, in the passage above.  It would be easy to dismiss Lacan’s 
jibe as a patronizing dismissal of the students’ revolt as adolescent acting-out if we didn’t 
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know that this was emphatically not his position, just as Duncan’s rejection of Levertov’s 
Vietnam poems can’t be simply aligned with ivory tower aestheticism. Rather, all the actors 
above are trying to sort out what a political subject-position can or should be.65 The 
complication for Duncan and Lacan comes from their insistence on the unconscious as 
something beyond the site of errors to be rectified or repressions to be unveiled.  One of the 
most spectacular sites of Duncan’s reflections on this subject appears in an astonishing letter 
of June 1968 to Levertov and her husband Mitch Goodman, himself a prominent antiwar 
activist.  Here, Duncan explicitly opposes conscience in the form of  “The Super Ego, that 
does not caution but sweeps aside all reservations”66 to “the other inner voice of conscience, 
our inner knowing what we have to do (not what we must do, not a moral imperative; but our 
sense of the given, when we “have” to do...)” (DL, 611).  Torturously and incompletely, 
Duncan seeks to understand the “conscience” of the super ego itself as a potentially libidinal 
and amoral agency, in a manner not wholly unlike Freud’s speculations in “Group 
Psychology and Analysis of the Ego.” Duncan admits to Levertov and Goodman that he is 
“troubled” by “the very courage of your convictions” which he associates with the “tyranny 
of the will” (DL, 611).  His far from satisfactory but still compelling conclusion is that he 
prefers to “evade the inner command, even as I would evade the draft [that is, forced military 
conscription] of the social command”:  “As in my work I would undo the commands even in 
obedience.  This is not a lawlessness, but a working with ideas of law.  No, I do not mean to 
evade conscience but to confront it, to know it out, appalled by it; neither to go with it nor 
oppose it but to be concerned with its nature” (DL, 611). In a properly Nietzschean 
transvalution of values, Duncan ceases to be able to fully distinguish conscience from its 
other.67 
 Meanwhile, returning to May 1968, Samo Tomsic, in his recent book The Capitalist 
Unconscious, revisits Lacan’s debate with Goldmann, arguing that the error of  the 
protagonists of May ’68 was that they “opposed structure and the event, or structure and 
politics, and herein lay one of their key failures.  Instead of thinking the events as an outburst 
of the structural real, they were guided by the fantasy of a pure real outside structure” (CU, 
21). To avoid similar ideas errors today, Tomsic argues that we must accept that “the subject 
of cognition. . .  cannot be the subject of politics” (CU, 6)—a position which rhymes with 
Duncan’s. Rather, what is required is “the formal inclusion of the subject of the unconscious 
in the field of politics” (CU, 22), a formulation explicitly opposed to the trivial reduction of 
politics to “unconscious complexes” (CU, 22), such as that which Lacan denounced in the 
wake of 1968.  This would be possible within a Lacanian framework because, Tomsic argues, 
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for the later Lacan structure “is less about stable and necessary relations than about 
contingency and contradiction” (CU, 206); that is, to use terms which Tomsic doesn’t, an 
economy or dynamics of conflicting forces, more in line with Bataille or Derrida. While 
Tomsic cannot fully explain how this “formal inclusion of the subject of unconscious” into 
politics might actually function, he nevertheless convincingly and crucially reminds us that 
an emphasis on the unconscious must not be seen as a retreat from the social into a “sphere of 
strictly private life” (CU, 79), as the Freudian unconscious abolishes the traditional 
public/private distinction, simply because “the existence and the formal mechanisms of the 
unconscious depend on the same structures, which determine the functioning of social links” 
(CU, 79). This leads him to the following pithy formulation:  “The motto shared between 
Marx and Freud would therefore be:  the impersonal is the political—namely the impersonal 
core of the personal” (CU, 80). Duncan’s recusal of “self-possession” within the context of 
an explicitly engaged political poetics must be seen as in line with these concerns, as well as 
a harbinger of the task of so many subsequent leftwing poets who have searched for what 
might be called an impersonalized lyric and simultaneously a historicized, non-transcendental 
impersonality—as if they had found Eliot’s tradition standing on its head, and were 
attempting to stand it on its feet again.  It is Duncan’s refusal of both the Eliotic/Spicerian 
raging clamor for the reign of death on the one hand and affirmationist voluntarism on the 
other that accounts for both his achievements and his limitations, as well as his mobilization 
of kitsch. In the end, for Duncan, the inclusion of the subject of the unconscious in the field 
of politics depends on the forms of writing of that knowledge which doesn’t know itself.  
Kitsch, hysteria, and dream are some of the names this writing takes. But more surprisingly, 
perhaps, for Duncan the solution to the quandary is neither desublimation nor unrepression, 
but rather obedience to “laws” and “orders” conceived along entirely new lines. The vitality 
of Duncan’s project comes from its refusal to distinguish that “order” from what is beyond or 
“out” of it; from its simultaneous need to separate “volition” from “compulsion” and its 
acknowledgement that that need speaks of “compulsion” itself.  If kitsch could be said to 
represent Duncan’s refusal of modernist ideals of aesthetic autonomy, his harping on “law” 
could be seen as a symmetrical refusal to fantasize a political subjective autonomy in its 
place. Duncan’s challenge then becomes to think the “law”—including that of conscience— 
beyond the parameters of a pseudo-Freudian mature acceptance of “frustration,” a fascist 
social erotics of submission and domination, or a naive valorization of transgressive freedom 
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1 Which is by no means solely a negative term for Tiffany, its implications in Pound’s case 
notwithstanding. 
2 Tiffany, My Silver, 155. 
3 Tiffany, My Silver, 169. If William Carlos Williams and Charles Olson of course did follow 
Pound’s totalising and epic precedent in Paterson and the Maximus Poems respectively, note 
that they both have at the base of their poetics the eschewal of Pound’s most kitschy 
elements: high style, archaic diction, assertion of sacred harmonies and unities, etc. 
4 Tomsic, The Capitalist Unconscious, 22.  Hereafter CU. 
5 The H. D. Book was in its inception commissioned by Norman Holmes Pearson as a 
homage meant to honor H. D. on her seventy-fourth birthday in 1960.  The book soon took 
on a life of its own, combining autobiography, poetics, political theorising, and a global 
account of modernist poetics generally, to mention only a few of the varied interests which 
                                                 
 29 
                                                                                                                                                        
led the book to balloon to its ultimate size of over 600 pages.  Written between 1959 and 
1964 and partially published in little magazines between 1966 and 1984—though widely 
disseminated in manuscript to Duncan’s interlocutors throughout its writing—the book was 
never published as a “whole” (a dubious term in relation to this work) until 2011.  See the 
editors’ Introduction to this edition, from which the information above was gleaned, for more 
details. 
6 Duncan, The H. D. Book, 55.  Hereafter HD. 
7 Could Duncan here be using “impersonate” as a negation of William James’ term 
“personate,” which he discusses later? Possibly, but oddly, like Freud’s Heimlich and 
Unheimliche, “personate” and “impersonate” mean the same thing, and perhaps testify to a 
like ambivalence. 
8 See Time and Western Man, where Lewis calls Pound “that curious thing, a person without 
a trace of originality of any sort” (67). As a receptive “consumer” rather than “producer,” 
Pound is also feminised in Lewis’ discourse, while his asserted preference for the “dead” 
over the “living” locks him still further into a decadent or kitsch discourse. 
9 Tiffany, My Silver, 134. 
10 For example, in his classic article on Kitsch Clement Greenberg already links it heavily to 
fascism and Stalinism: precisely because of its inauthenticity as a “synthetic” form which 
“predigests” experience, rather than creating it, for Greenberg kitsch is the ideal cultural form 
for propaganda and enforced cultural docility (15). 
11 Already in ABC of Influence, a book to which this essay is indebted, Christopher Beach 
notes that  for Duncan a crucial aspect of Pound’s modernism was the “vital connection” 
between “literary form and political engagement” (163).  And by taking the tale of Gassire’s 
Lute—one central to Pound—as his starting point, in his magisterial study of Duncan’s anti-
war poetry Nathaniel Mackey inevitably focuses on the Poundian legacy. 
12 Stephen Collis quotes this phrase and refers to other related ones which I also discuss in his 
illuminating piece on the “poetic commons” in Duncan, there suggesting that Duncan’s 
“main late theme” might be resistance to “the enclosure of the poetic commons” (47).  Collis 
quite rightly remarks that Duncan as Freudian sees his task as “to resist the privatizing ego” 
(51). I seek to delve further into that insight in this article. In his Introduction to Reading 
Duncan Reading Collis returns to some of these issues, framing them in the crucial context of 
intertextuality, central to Duncan’s practice as a self-described “derivative” poet.  Building 
on the work of critics like Nathaniel Mackey, who has stressed how Duncan responds to 
accusations of a sequestered “bookishness” by figuring such a poetry as a “communal form” 
(89), Collis writes “Essentially, what I’m arguing for is the social significance  of 
intertextuality” and “the model of sociality” that Duncan’s derivative poetics propose (xvii). 
George Fragopolous extends these enquiries on intertextuality, the derivative, and the 
communal in his interesting essay in the same volume, also noting the pertinence of Duncan’s 
Freudian position. 
13 Duncan, Collected Essays, 59 (hereafter CE).  The critique of “self-possession” in this 
piece is intertwined with the broader critique of property which leads Duncan to cite the 
adage “Property is theft” (59). It’s clear that for Duncan, self-possession is a subset of this 
form of property. Duncan attacks the idea of the lyric I as the poet’s private property in many 
places in his writing, such as in “Man’s Fulfilment in Order and Strife,” where discussing 
Browning’s dramatic monologues he ventures: “. . . Browning’s art of speaking in many 
imagined persons created an order of poetry, of made-up things, in what was most feared as a 
mental disorder, a splitting into a multitude of projected personalities—none of them 
Browning’s own. Against the private property of self, he created a community of selves....” 
(Collected Essays, 203-4). 
14 Pavón-Cuéllar, Marxism, 177. 
 30 
                                                                                                                                                        
15 “Permission” is a crucial word for Duncan, and is stressed heavily in many sections of The 
H. D. Book, as well as grounding one of Duncan’s most important poems, “Often I Am 
Permitted to Return to a Meadow.” 
16 See Sherry, pp. 280-7, for a reading of Barnes as decadent modernist. 
17 See Robert Kaufman for interesting comments on Duncan’s relationship to Ginsberg by 
way of a comparison of their varied relationships to Romanticism. While Kaufman’s 
arguments are often compelling, I find that as counter-balance to modernist dogma decadence 
and kitsch operate more powerfully for Duncan than high Romanticism does. 
18 Duncan explicitly likens his conception of this textual structure to Freud’s (ultimately 
rejected) deployment of the history of Rome as a model for the Unconscious in  Civilization 
and its Discontents. That is to say, stylistically Duncan hopes the “final” version of The H. D. 
Book will display the traces of all the previous versions that it never finishes revising: not the 
original or its revision, but the dialogue of both. 
19 Though I don’t have the space to discuss this here, Duncan’s work in this vein anticipates 
that of Susan Howe in My Emily Dickinson and The Birth-mark. His own reading of 
Hawthorne’s tale “The Birthmark” looks forward to and possibly informs Howe’s further 
explorations in important ways.  Like Howe, Duncan finds Hawthorne’s tale of a husband’s 
rage to excise a physical “imperfection” from the body of his wife to be an effective allegory 
of a rage for “purity” in art, and his critique is feminist in several ways:  the woman’s body 
literally incarnates the fault to be cut into shape, as Poundian imagism stresses the cutting of 
unruly texts in a manner that Duncan thought was internalised by the young H. D in her own 
self-policing. Duncan also reads the “birthmark” to be removed quite literally: as the mark of 
the maternal that must be repressed.  Howe’s reading greatly develops and extends the 
feminist implications of Duncan’s reading.   
20 I refer to Pound’s crucial early definition of Imagism:  “An ‘Image’ is that which presents 
an intellectual and emotional complex in an instant of time” (Literary Essays, 4).  
21 Pound, Selected Prose, 22-3. 
22 There is a somewhat similar formulation in “The Truth and Life of Myth,” in which 
Duncan argues that the experience of release felt in waking up from the bounds of dreaming 
to the “work-a-day” and comfortable daytime world is “experienced in reverse by the convert 
to psychoanalysis, who begins to find in dreams, or, rather, in his interpretations of dreams, 
the real tenor of daily life” (148).  
23 H. D., Helen, 1. 
24 H. D., Helen, 13. 
25 Nancy, La Communauté, 109, for original French. My translation. 
26 Nancy, La Communauté, 100, for original French.  My translation. 
27 Nancy, La Communauté, 144-15 for original French.  My translation. 
28 Laplanche and Pontalis, Fantasme, 67-8 for original French.  My translation. 
29 Laplanche and Pontalis, Fantasme, 81 for original French.  My translation. 
30 Laplanche and Pontalis, Fantasme, 96-7 for original French.  My translation. 
31 Rabaté, Pathos, 109. 
32 Spicer, My Vocabulary, 383. 
33 Spicer, My Vocabulary, 150. 
34 It should be noted that the essay gestures at differentiating a more nuanced “Jung” from the 
“Jungians” it targets, but this line of inquiry is not fully pursued. Note that the reference to 
“organs” in the passage above is also a dig at the desexualising tendencies of Jungian 
analysis, as the broader context makes very clear. 
35 Duncan comes back to this idea in many places in The H. D. Book, including by way of a 
long passage from William James on how in recent psychology “The menagerie and the 
madhouse, the nursery, the prison, and the hospital, have been made to deliver up their 
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material. The world of mind is shown as something infinitely more complex than was 
suspected; and whatever beauties it may still possess it has lost at any rate the beauty of 
academic neatness” (605).  It is from this basis that Duncan will go on to discuss hysteria as 
something other than a simple symptom or illness. 
36 Duncan hints that he’s working from the original publication of “Psychology and the 
Troubadours” in The Quest. 
37 Moreover, Lucy Allen Paton, whose work Jack Spicer quotes without attribution in The 
Holy Grail, argues that Arthurian Romance derives from the Celtic “fairy story,” and Duncan 
might be drawing on her work here. 
38 And note that Duncan’s queerness has a clear “effeminate,” domestic, and parapractical 
cast, far from the heroic manliness of some other modes of queer political affirmation, like 
much of Whitman’s, for example. 
39 Pound’s preface to Rémy de Gourmont’s Natural Philosophy of Love is a classic modernist 
statement of this position. 
40 Of course, that there were precedents of powerful student activism outside the US is part of 
what made the events so distressing to the establishment at the time. Anxieties about 
Berkeley becoming like a “Latin American” campus were frequently expressed.  See Draper, 
p. 59 for a discussion of this. 
41 Duncan, Collected Later Poems, 376; hereafter CLP. 
42 In the course of their increasingly mutually hurtful exchange over their anti-war poems, 
Denise Levertov noted this disjunction of modes herself, though uses different to terms to 
discuss it (Duncan and Levertov, pp. 519-20).   
43 The more powerful strains of Duncan’s thinking can be seen to align with some of the 
questions Jean-Luc Nancy opens in his work on community, as both Stephen Collis and 
George Fragopolous have suggested. Also pertinent for these questions is a Freudian 
perspective succinctly summarised by Pavón-Cuellar: “Consonant with Marx. . . Freud 
conceives the individual as a point of arrival, not departure” (46). 
44 Spicer’s legendary Vancouver lecture on dictation, delivered in June, 1965, speaks in very 
similar terms, precisely in reference to the example of a conscious desire to write a political 
poem. Evoking “the real thing, the thing you didn’t want to say in terms of your own ego,” 
Spicer, condemning as puerile the conscious desire to write a poem to say “I think that the 
Vietnam crisis is terrible” hails the hypothetical situation in which “. . . you’re trying to write 
a poem on Vietnam and you write a poem about skating in Vermont” (House, 6-7). Spicer’s 
view was not that the poet should be “above” politics; rather, he mistrusted the conscious will 
as a source of the poetic. 
45 Norman Finkelstein also cites this phrase in his extremely helpful article “Robert Duncan, 
Poet of the Law,” which touches on many of the paradoxes that interest me here. However, I 
think Finkelstein might underestimate how difficult it is in Duncan’s formulation for the poet 
to come to consciousness of the true necessity behind her relationship to the law, which 
Finkelstein posits as Duncan’s goal. 
46 Debord, La Société, 187 for original French; translation mine. 
47 Kerr, The Uses, 87-8. 
48 Kerr, The Uses, 88. 
49 This book, a collective production, was hastily written and published in the midst of the 
conflict pitting students and faculty against the administration. 
50 In point of fact, Kerr was Chancellor of the entire UC system while Edward Strong was 
Chancellor of the Berkeley campus, but Kerr stepped in early to take charge during the FSM 
crisis. 
51 Thompson et al, Warwick University, 39-40. 
52 Kerr,  The Uses, 20. 
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53 Kerr, The Uses, 6. 
54 Kerr, The Uses, 29. 
55 For echoes of some of the specific falsities Duncan denounces here, see accounts of 
erroneous reporting in Draper, pp. 59-60 and 112-114. 
56 See Eric Keenaghan, who also discusses Duncan’s opposition to “the private property of 
self” (116) in an account of of how such positions lead Duncan to a rejection of classic 
liberalism. 
57 Tiffany, My Silver, 32. 
58 Fredman, Before Caesar’s Gate, 67.  Denise Levertov, a former poetry editor for The 
Nation, was probably a better-known and more influential poet than Duncan in the 60s, 
certainly among the more mainstream cultural and literary communities. She and Duncan had 
been close friends and interlocutors since the early fifties, and their collected correspodence 
stretches to 700 large-format pages. During the Vietnam War Levertov was among the most 
visible and radical of the cultural figures in opposition, and this visibility itself emerges as an 
issue for Duncan during these years.  Their rupture has been very widely discussed. See for 
example the Introduction to their correspondence, along with Fredman, Fragopolous, Mlinko, 
and Davidson, as well as Bertholf and Gelpi’s collection of essays.  As the violence of their 
disagreement increased the terms of it also evolved and changed. By the crucial years of 
1970-71, Duncan’s censure of Levertov increasingly took the form of the accusation that her 
political stances were largely the product of a displaced female ressentiment.  This 
troublingly misogynistic turn requires a study in itself. Meanwhile, for a brilliant reading of 
the structural contradictions governing Duncan’s anti-war poetry, see Mackey’s study 
“Gassire’s Lute” in his book, The Paracritical Hinge.  Mackey shows two constant problems 
Duncan wrestled with, both of which resonate with this essay. First is Duncan’s anxiety that 
poetry might “feed” off the war as subject matter, turning to poetic profit the outrages of the 
war’s violence in a vampiric an unethical manner.  Second is his concern that the power of 
poetry, to the extent that it has any, might not be opposed to war’s violence but rather a form 
of it—that poetry and war cannot be entirely dissociated.  Mackey powerfully shows how this 
problem is indissolubly linked to the deepest foundations of Duncan’s poetics:  “To see that 
the word is not a containment but a contention of meanings is to see also that war isn’t 
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